Kenneth William Orton, Jr.
Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps

Kenneth William Orton, Jr. was born in Buffalo, NY, on 7 April 1941. His Emergency Data Sheet did not list his parents, but rather his grandmother, Olga Fix. As his home of record was listed as Kenmore, NY and his grandmother’s address was Kenmore, NY, it is assumed that Ken was raised by his grandmother.

Ken signed his first four-year enlistment in the U. S. Marine Corps on 30 July 1959 in Buffalo, NY. He re-enlisted on 30 July 1963 in Kittery, ME. He was married to Barbara J. Orton and had two sons, Kenneth W. Orton III and Lance D. Orton, before he was ordered to Vietnam. While Ken was deployed, his wife was living in Penacook, NH.

Combat History & Events Leading to the Death of Sergeant Kenneth William Orton, Jr., 1886079, USMC

Ken’s tour of duty in Vietnam was varied. Upon arrival in Vietnam, Ken was assigned as the Platoon Right Guide with the 1st Platoon of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Amphibious Force. Upon reporting, his Platoon Commander was 2ndLt Peter L. Meade but, by mid-July, command had passed to 2ndLt David L. Mellon. As Right Guide, Ken’s responsibilities were the coordination of the logistics to support the platoon, to include ordering and distribution of food, water, ammunition, batteries and military equipment and weapons. As Right Guide, Ken participated in Operations DaNang, Liberty, and Macon. Upon the conclusion of Operation Liberty on 30 June 1966, Bravo Company took up a static position on the southwest edge of the Battalion’s Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Ken’s 1st Platoon was located approximately 1000 meters east of the confluence of the Song Thu Bon and Vu Gia rivers and patrolled the area extensively to control the activities of the local Viet Cong units and to keep Liberty Road, the Main Supply Route (MSR) from Danang to An Hoa open through their assigned territory. After Operation Liberty, Ken’s platoon suffered no casualties for a period of three months.

On 29 September 1966, Ken’s Battalion departed Vietnam to go through a refitting process on Okinawa, Japan, in preparation for serving on the Special Landing Force (SLF). New personnel joined the platoon during the intensive training period at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. As Ken was junior to many of the new Non-Commissioned Officers and Staff NCOs, who joined the Battalion on Okinawa, he was transferred to the 2nd Platoon under 2ndLt Melvin L. Thompson and assigned as a squad leader, a billet appropriate to his grade. After leaving Okinawa, the Battalion spent time at the SLF Camp in Subic Bay in the Philippines for additional training and acclimatization. In the Philippines, Ken’s Bravo Company was assigned as the Amtrak Company and practiced an amphibious landing on Mindoro Island.

On 6 January 1967, Ken’s Company was committed to Operation Deckhouse V in the Phanh Phu District of Kien Hoa Province, south of Saigon in the Mekong River Delta. Bravo Company launched from the LST-1166 USS Washtenaw County in LVTP-5 (Amtraks) and amphibiously assaulted the beach. The operation was intent on disrupting the activities of the Viet Cong’s 518th Coastal Security Battalion and the C-530 Company. Ken’s platoon was heli-lifted on the second day of the operation to an operational area just north of the beach and the adjacent mangrove and pushed to the northeast for the next 7 days. While Ken’s platoon was subjected to daily sniping by the Viet Cong, it was only involved in two substantial actions.

The first action occurred on 10 January. While sweeping to the northeast at 09:30, Ken’s platoon was taken under small arms and automatic weapon fire by a group of 5 to 8 Viet Cong. The Bravo Company command group and a section of 81mm mortars was traveling with Bravo 2 at the time. During the firefight, which lasted approximately 15 minutes, 2ndLt Thompson established a base of fire with one of his squads and directed another to envelop the Viet Cong position. 2ndLt Thompson also called for mortar and artillery fire on the entrenched Viet Cong. The two 60mm mortars assigned to 2nd Platoon fired 55 rounds at the enemy, while the two 81mm mortars of the section assigned to the Bravo Company command group fired an additional 25 rounds. An artillery fire mission from Delta Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines put 30 high explosive 105mm rounds on the target area. The resistance was eliminated and it was estimated that 5 Viet Cong had been killed. Marine casualties from the action were one KIA (LCpl Roger E. Cooper) [Honoree Record ID 240977] and two WIAs.

Two days later, at approximately 10:15 on 12 January, one squad from Bravo 2 was involved in the second substantial action. Due to the level of detail in the After Action Report, it is not possible to determine if it was Ken’s squad that was involved in the fight or not. It is reported that a squad from Bravo 2’s was patrolling forward of the platoon patrol base. A similar sized Viet Cong unit, estimated at 20, sprung an ambush on the squad from prepared positions. The squad hit the deck and began returning fire. The Squad Leader was able to contact the Bravo Company command group and quickly get the 81mm mortar section into action. As the firefight continued, he was similarly able to get support from the 105mm guns of Delta Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, who fired 10 high explosive rounds at the Viet Cong positions. As the squad continued to return fire, an armed UH1E (Huey) gunship came on station and the fire of the indirect weapons were lifted to allow the gunship to make three passes expending rockets and strafing the enemy with its 7.62mm Gatling guns. After approximately 45 minutes, the Viet Cong broke off the fight and disappeared into the mangrove. The squad reported killing 4 Viet Cong, but at a cost of 5 Marines wounded and evacuated to the infirmary aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

Bravo Company was relieved on the afternoon of 13 January and returned to the command ship, the USS Iwo Jima to function as the Battalion Landing Team’s reserve for the balance of the operation. Operation Deckhouse V concluded two days later on 15 January and after stops in Vung Tau, Vietnam, Subic Bay, Philippines, and Camp Schwab, Okinawa, the Battalion returned to Vietnam on 5 February. The Battalion debarked from ships and motored up the Perfume River in Landing Crafts, Medium (LCMs) to the ramp in Hue City. Marine trucks moved the Battalion to Phu Bai. Next, Ken’s Company was detached from the Battalion and sent to Khe Sanh, an isolated combat base in the northwest corner of Vietnam near both the Laotian border and the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam. Bravo Company replaced 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines with the mission of providing security to the Combat Base.

Soon after arriving at Khe Sanh, the command of Ken’s platoon passed from 2ndLt Melvin L. Thompson to 2ndLt John M. Kramer. Once on the ground, Bravo Company’s platoons began normal activities of one daytime squad patrol, one nighttime squad ambush and one fire-team sized night listening post. On 25 February, an encounter with an NVA mortar section and its security component changed the Company’s approach. Sgt Harper’s squad from Ken’s Bravo 2 made the first contacts. The “Sparrow Hawk,” the Combat Base’s quick reaction force was activated and 2ndLt David L. Mellon led Sgt Chapp’s Bravo 1-1 to exploit the contact approximately 2500 meters west of the combat base. At approximately 14:00, Bravo 1-1 deployed and under cover of supporting artillery fire moved to the top of the knoll where the original contact had occurred. After exchanging small arms fire and hand grenades with the NVA, a Huey with a Forward Air Controller (FAC) aboard was sent from the Combat Base to assist. The artillery fire mission was terminated and the FAC called in a flight of F-4B “Phantom” aircraft armed with 500-pound bombs. In the face of the massive display of supporting arms, the NVA broke contact and retreated. A subsequent sweep of the battlefield found 9 NVA bodies, 1 complete 82mm mortar, 2 more mortar baseplates, 1 mortar bipod, 1 mortar sight, 180 – 82mm mortar rounds with fuses and a complete fire direction center. Bravo 1-1 and Bravo 2-2 had disrupted the NVA plan to mortar the Khe Sanh Combat Base. However, the fight proved costly to the Marines. The Squad Leader, Sgt Robert A. Chapp [Honoree Record ID 3631] and the Platoon’s Right Guide, SSgt Kendell D. Cutbirth [Honoree Record ID 242158] died and 8 other Marines and 1 Corpsman were wounded and evacuated for treatment. Simultaneously, long range Recon patrols were confirming increased NVA activity to the North and West of the Combat Base.

Accordingly, in the aftermath of the 25 February action, Bravo Company became even more aggressive in its patrolling to the northwest. Daily squad patrols were replaced by multi-day platoon-strength, 4-day patrols. For a time, Bravo Company was joined in the security mission by Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.

On 16 March, as Echo 1 moved up the eastern side of Hill 861, they were taken under small arms fire and mortars by NVA troops located near the summit. Bravo 2, Ken’s platoon under 2nd Lt. Kramer, was directed to go to their relief. As speed was critical, Bravo 2 shed their flak jackets and double-timed to the engaged Echo 1 position. This mistake led to a significant number of additional serious casualties later, when the NVA placed precise mortar fire on the Marines. The “Sparrow Hawk” reaction force consisting of Bravo 3-3 led by 2ndLt Gatlin J. Howell in a CH-46 helicopter, attempted to land but was disabled by ground fire and made a soft crash landing approximately 800 meters south of Hill 861. Fortunately, there were no serious injuries among those on board the helicopter and another CH-46 swooped in and rescued them. The combined units on the ground had heavy casualties from fire fights and attempted to bring in medevac helicopters to evacuate the wounded and dead, but accurate mortar fire by the NVA created even more numerous casualties during the afternoon and early evening. The combination of small arms from prepared and camouflaged positions, and precise mortar targeting, devastated the two platoons. Echo 1 suffered 10 Marines KIA and 29 WIA, while Bravo 2, suffered 8 KIA: Sgt Donald E. Harper [Honoree Record ID 251761]; Sgt Sylvester Land [Honoree Record ID 259438]; PFC Danny E. Nicklow [Honoree Record ID 267734]; PFC James E. Perry [Honoree Record ID 270123]; LCpl Alfred Pino [Honoree Record ID 270722]; Pvt David Rhoades [Honoree Record ID 272909]; LCpl Ted Williams [Honoree Record ID 286264]; and 34 WIA. Ken was the only Squad Leader to survive the brutal fighting.

The NVA elected to avoid contact with the Marines for the next few weeks while they moved supplies and man power into the Hill 881/Hill 861 corridor leading to the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

On 24 April, Bravo Company’s aggressive patrolling to the northwest engaged the NVA before they were completely ready to make an attempt to overrun the combat base. Ken’s platoon was involved in the early fighting of what later became known as “The Hill Fights” at Khe Sanh and was the action in which he gave his life. At 04:30, Bravo 1 and Bravo 3 moved out of overnight positions approximately 2 kilometers northeast of Hill 861. They were tasked with checking out some caves to the west where the NVA were suspected of storing weapons and supplies. By 10:00, Ken’s platoon Bravo 2, led by 2ndLt Thomas G. King who succeeded Lt Kramer, along with a section of 81mm mortars, had moved from the combat base to Hill 700, two kilometers south of Hill 861 and set up a perimeter. The 81mm mortars were in position to provide fire support to Bravo 1 and Bravo 3 while they maneuvered. Lt King sent a two-man artillery Forward Observer team with two riflemen for security to the top of Hill 861 to see it they could be helpful in supporting the two platoons north of the summit. 1stLt Phillip H. Sauer, the platoon commander for the heavy section of Ontos positioned at the combat base, accompanied the group intent on determining whether his Ontos could maneuver in the terrain to the northwest of the combat base. Approximately 300 meters from the summit of Hill 861, the group was ambushed and only one Marine survived.

Simultaneously, Bravo 1, in the lead of the two other Bravo platoons moving westward toward the cave complex, got involved in a brief firefight. Captain Sayers, who had been monitoring these actions from the base Command Operations Center, upon realizing the NVA were on Hill 861 in force, ordered his 1st Platoon, under 2ndLt James D. Carter to change direction and move to the south to Hill 861 in order to attack the NVA from their rear. Captain Sayers then set out from the combat base with a security element to join Lt King, 2500 meters to the west, at Hill 700 and coordinate the attack on Hill 861.

Ken’s platoon commander sent a squad to retrieve the bodies of the forward observer group. Again, due to the limited detail in the contemporary reports, it is not possible to identify whether the squad that went up was Ken’s or not. While the squad got to the area of the ambush and could see two Marine bodies, they could not reach them due to heavy fire. So, the squad returned to the platoon’s command post on Hill 700. Lt King then placed heavy mortar and artillery fire on the ambush site and led a squad back up to recover the bodies. This time the NVA held their fire and allowed the Marines to recover the two bodies that had been located. Withdrawing from the ambush site, Lt King found an acceptable LZ and called in a UH-34 to evacuate the two bodies. When the helicopter touched down, the NVA opened up with small arms fire, hitting the bird 35 times. The Marines were able to get the bodies aboard and the two Huey gunships that accompanied the UH-34 strafed the crest of the hill. After the casualties they had been able to find were evacuated, Lt King and the squad returned to the mortar position.

As Bravo 1 continued to the south, they encountered entrenched NVA. Bravo 1 called for mortar fire from the tubes at Lt King’s position approximately 2500 meters to their south on the other side of Hill 861. The rounds fell on the NVA positions and along with artillery rounds from the combat base, allowed Bravo 1 to pull back and attempt the evacuation of their casualties. Bravo 1 was able to get three wounded aboard the first medevac helicopter, but heavy automatic weapons fire and accurate mortar fire on the landing zone created even more casualties and subsequent medevac attempts had to be aborted due to heavy NVA fire. Bravo 3, under SSgt Alfredo V. Reyes, was instructed to abandon the move to the cave complex and follow in trace of Bravo 1 but, as they switched direction, they too were taken under fire by the NVA. They called in an airstrike in order to eliminate crew-served weapons which had them pinned down, but the pilot dropped his bombs prematurely and six Marines from Bravo 3 died as a result of friendly fire.

With nightfall approaching and all of their mortar rounds expended, the mortar section, Captain Sayers and his security element, and Ken’s platoon marched back to combat base to prepare for the following day. Bravo 1 and Bravo 3, on the northwest approach to Hill 861, hunkered down for the night as well. The Marine casualties for 24 April totaled 12 KIA, 17 WIA and 2 MIA.

On the morning of 25 April, Capt Sayers had Ken’s platoon organized into three heli-teams for insertion by CH-46 helicopters at Bravo 1’s position approximately 1400 meters northwest of Hill 861. Ken’s squad was in the 1st heli-team and would board the lead helicopter along with Capt Sayers, his command group and the new Bravo 2 Platoon Sergeant, SSgt Leon R. Burns. Early morning fog delayed the insertion attempt until 10:00. Finally, there was a hole in the fog and the lead CH-46 was able to get into the zone and disembark its full load and pick up three WIAs before being driven off by NVA mortar fire. The fog, however, closed in and the balance of the flights which would have taken Lt King and the balance of Bravo 2 to the Bravo 1 LZ were aborted. The heavy fog covered the movements of Bravo 1 and Bravo 3 as they continued southeast toward Hill 861. Loaded down with their KIAs and their non-ambulatory WIAs and harassed by NVA small arms fire, the Company’s strength was sapped and they were only able to move 600 meters on the 25th. They settled in for the night in two separate defensive perimeters; Bravo 1 and that portion of Ken’s platoon that were able to land in one, and Bravo 3 in another, approximately 800 meters northwest of Hill 861.

By dawn on 26 April, the fog had lifted somewhat and visibility was fair. Bravo Company continued its movement to the southeast toward Hill 861. The Company was moving in column with Bravo 1 in the lead, Ken’s squad at the front of the Bravo 2 Marines, followed by Capt Sayers command group. Bravo 3 caught up to the lead elements and joined the company movement at 08:40.

SSgt Burns described the ensuing action in a USMC Oral History Tape recorded on 8 May 1967: “We were still heading for Hill 861. We got to a small hill approximately 500 meters northwest of it. We got on top of it. We took a few sniper rounds. We started down the far side and the stuff really hit the fan…The Third Platoon had managed to link up with the First and my people were in the middle with the CP group. As they started down off the hill, getting right up to the very base of Hill 861’s summit, they came under heavy automatic fire. At this time the First Platoon leader was wounded and about four or five other men. I lost one of my squad leaders (Sgt Orton) and the M-79 man and one of my machine-gunners, LCpl Puelo, who spotted an enemy machine gun, fired on it, exposed himself to fire and lost his left thumb and was wounded in the left side in two or three places…Sergeant Orton, my squad leader and point man was cut in half by a burst from a machinegun…”

The succinct “Report of Casualty” Defense Department Form 1300 for Sgt Orton merely read: “Died 26Apr67 vicinity of Quang Tri Republic of Vietnam result gunshot wound to abdomen from hostile fire during an operation.” Sergeant Orton’s death was another tragic loss in the hardships Bravo Company was forced to endure for another day.

At 14:45 on 26 April, Capt Sayers reported to the Operations Officer of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, to which operational control of Bravo Company had passed, that he had so many casualties that he could not move. It was suggested that Bravo Company abandon its dead and extricate itself. Capt Sayers advised that he had so many wounded that abandoning his dead would not be sufficient. Capt Sayers advised that he would move into the fog and fight until it was over.

The Commanding Officer of 3/3, LtCol Gary Wilder, recognizing that Bravo Company was no longer an effective fighting force and concerned that the use of massive supporting arms on Hill 861 might endanger them, decided he must get them out. LtCol Wilder dispatched Captain Jerrald E. Giles of Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines to locate Bravo Company and bring them back to Hill 700. Captain Giles selected his 1st Platoon, led by 1stLt John B. Woodall for the mission. Kilo 1 and the Company Command Group loaded with extra ammunition and water headed around the western flank of Hill 861 to link up with Bravo Company.

After being advised that help was on its way, Capt Sayers sent the second squad from Bravo 1 led by Sgt Kenneth D. Vermillion and the platoon commander, 2ndLt Carter, to meet the relief force. The squad rendezvoused with Kilo 1 at approximately 1800 and brought them back to Bravo Company. The combined force cut poles to make poncho litters to carry out the dead, including Ken, and non-ambulatory wounded. The combined force moved throughout the night and at 05:30 on 27 April they reached LtCol Wilder’s CP. The dead and wounded were evacuated by helicopter to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Despite the availability of trucks to transport the survivors, the proud remnants of Bravo Company walked in to the Combat Base.

The Bravo Company losses over the three-day period were staggering: 24 KIA (including Sgt Kenneth W. Orton, Jr.); 46 WIA with wounds sufficiently severe to require evacuation; and 8 missing that were later confirmed KIA.

The remnants of the Company were flown by C-130 from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha at 16:30 on 27 April, where they received additional personnel and reorganized to again become an effective fighting force. During the period of time that Ken served at Khe Sanh, he was credited with participating in Operations Prairie II and III.

Sgt Ken Orton had just celebrated his 26th birthday and 7¾ years of service in the Marine Corps when he was killed on 26 April 1967 approximately 500 meters West of Hill 861 near the Khe Sanh Combat Base in Quang Tri Province of the Republic of Vietnam. Ken was the 1,159th Marine to die in Vietnam in 1967.

Medals and Awards

Purple Heart
Combat Action Ribbon
Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Vietnam Service Medal
Vietnam Campaign Medal

Honors

The name Kenneth W Orton Jr is located on Panel 18E Line 96 of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall.

Burial

The body of Sergeant Kenneth William Orton, Jr. was returned to his wife, Barbara, in Penacook, NH. On 8 May 1967, he was buried with full military honors at the Maple Grove Cemetery in Concord, Merrimack County, NH, in Section B, Lot 62, Grave 1.

[The information in the above Combat History & Events was furnished by Sgt Orton's Platoon Commander, 2ndLt David L. Mellon (later Captain), and is used with his written consent.]