Raymond George Potter
Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps

Raymond George Potter graduated from Youngstown State University, OH, and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1965. He reported in October 1965 for the 38th Officer Candidate Course at Quantico, VA, and was assigned to the 4th Platoon of Charlie Company. However, for reasons known only to the OCS Staff, he was dropped from the class after 10 weeks, just before graduation. Raymond and 42 other Officer Candidates were dropped on 16 December 1965 and reassigned to Schools Demonstration Troops (SDT) for a period of approximately 60 days for further infantry training and future assignment by the Commandant, as appropriate. While it is entirely possible that Raymond could have avoided service in Vietnam, it was specifically to lead Marines that he had joined the Marine Corps and committed himself to the officer training of OCS. When serving as an officer was no longer available to him, he apparently volunteered to serve with the infantry so he could get to the fight. With his college education, Ray had access to virtually any Marine MOS he desired, but he elected to be a Rifleman (MOS 0311). Raymond stayed on at Quantico until May 1966. He then visited with a Marine friend, Paul Ross, in Newton, MA, before returning to his home in Campbell, OH, for the balance of his leave. At the conclusion of his leave, Raymond made his way across the US and reported to the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines for duty.

In May 1966, PFC Potter was assigned to 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines at Camp Pendleton, CA. He trained with the Company from late June until the 3rd Battalion deployed to the Republic of Vietnam on 7 September 1966 as part of the 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Amphibious Force in Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. The ship had an intermediate stop in Hawaii enroute to Okinawa. The Battalion spent approximately one month on Okinawa training for their service in Vietnam and preparing for assignment to the Special Landing Force (SLF). It was during this training period on Okinawa that Raymond was promoted to Corporal. Next, the Battalion was assigned to the SLF. The Battalion was scheduled to make a planned operation as part of its time on the SLF; but, while practicing vertical assault and amphibious doctrine in the Philippines, a copy of the operation plan (378-66) was lost on Mindaro Island in November 1966. With the operation having been compromised, it was scuttled. The Battalion did deploy as Battalion Landing Team 3/26 (BLT 3/26) to the waters of the South China Sea off South Vietnam and remained on the SLF, as a ready reaction force for another month, but was never committed in country. They returned to Subic Bay in the Philippines in early December 1966 to change shipping and were inserted at Dong Ha on 11 December.

The original members of 3/26 were broken up in April 1967. Cpl Potter remained with L-2, while the other members of his fire team were either transferred to other Lima platoons or other battalions. The Corps didn't want all of the personnel in 3/26 to rotate at the same time, so personnel were swapped among other battalions of the 26th and 9th Marine Regiments. Later, the events of 27 June 1967 were to result in Raymond being transferred from Lima-2 to Lima-3. A patrol from Combined Action Company - Oscar (CAC-O) located in the village of Khe Sanh, was searching for an NVA mortar site in the vicinity of Hill 689 which was approximately 4 kilometers west of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. When CAC-O made contact, India Company was dispatched to exploit the contact. Next, Lima Company was heli-lifted to an unnamed hill approximately 500 meters south of Hill 689. Lima Company moved toward Hill 689 with L-3 and L-2 on line, with L-3 on the left flank. L-1 remained in place and provided security for the LZ. As Lima Company moved to link up with India Company, they encountered small arms fire and booby-traps. During the fighting and consolidation, 4 of Lima's personnel were KIA including the Company Commander, Captain Bynum; the Company Gunnery Sergeant; and the 3rd Platoon Commander. Of the Company's 15 WIAs, several were from the 1st Squad of Lima-3. Only 4 of those assigned to the 1st Squad were still effective. As a result of the decimation of 1st Squad, Lima-3, Raymond was transferred to that Squad. It was the death of Captain Bynum on 27 June that necessitated the assignment of Captain Camp to lead the Company. [Again, the book "Lima-6" provides a narrative of Lima Company's operations from 30 June 1967 through the date that Raymond died - 10 September 1967.]

By 7 September, Raymond had been out of the Continental United States (CONUS) for nearly 12 months. He had been pulled out of the field because he had less than 11 days to serve in Vietnam. He was with the Battalion rear in Dong Ha getting ready to depart for Da Nang and assignment to a "Freedom Bird" heading back to the States. He had orders in hand that directed him to depart RVN on 18 September. His company, Lima, had been on a “Rough Rider” operation that day as security for a logistics convoy to Camp Evans, while the balance of the Battalion had engaged the 812th NVA Regiment north of Cam Lo. The Company returned to Dong Ha the evening of 7 September.

The heavily-engaged Battalion Commander, LtCol Alderman, requested that his detached Company, Lima, be returned to his operational control and delivered to his CP, just west of the Cam Lo - Con Thien MSR, approximately 1 kilometer north of the firebase C-2. Captain Dick Camp, realizing that he was going to be inserted into an area where the Battalion was heavily engaged and needing every Marine possible, personally approached all 30 of the short timers, who had been pulled out of the field, and asked them to redraw their equipment and weapons and join the Company the next morning when they were trucked out to join the Battalion. Captain Camp stated in his book, "they didn't have to go, but they did." Raymond was one of those who put the threat to the men of his Company, "his Marines," over his personal safety. Raymond volunteered to "get back in the fight" and resumed command of his fireteam with Lima’s third platoon. He would rejoin Lima-3 and move with them for the next three days.

The events of the next three days for Lima Company are well documented. On 8 September, Lima Company was trucked to a site approximately one kilometer North of the Marine firebase know as C-2, which stood astride the MSR. While they were debarking the trucks and getting organized for the march to Hill 48, where the Battalion CP was located, the NVA fired rockets at them. Lima and the two platoons from Kilo Company, who were moving the Battalion's dead and wounded from the 7 September action to the trucks for evacuation, received 35 rounds of accurate 140mm rocket fire that the NVA directed at the massed troops and trucks. After evacuating the new casualties from the rocket fire, which included 1 KIA and 28 WIA, Lima Company hoisted the ammunition replenishment and humped in, following their guides from Kilo Company, to join the Battalion. 9 September was uneventful. Lima Company did send out a near-in patrol, but it turned up nothing. At approximately 1600, the Battalion displaced approximately 700 meters to the South and set in on a hill identified as Hill 48 to avoid mortar and rocket barrages on their daytime position.

It was the intent of the Battalion Commander to move India Company approximately two kilometers to the Southwest and have them occupy a hill that, subsequently-developed intelligence indicated, was the Regimental CP for the 812th NVA Regiment. The Battalion would then displace forward approximately 1 kilometer to a hill that India Company would march over as it established its outpost to the West. The scheme of maneuver had Lima Company moving out to approximately 1/2 of the distance to the objective. Next, India Company would move past the right flank of Lima Company and over the Battalion's objective to secure a hilltop approximately 1 kilometer West of the Battalion's objective. Once India Company was in place, Lima Company would lead the balance of the Battalion to it's objective and establish a new Battalion perimeter. The plan called for the Battalion to receive a re-supply early on the morning of 10 September to facilitate the move. Unfortunately, the re-supply was delayed and subsequent NVA actions thwarted the plan.

The actual events of 10 September found Lima Company moving off Hill 48 at approximately 0730 to the Southwest along a ridgeline and setting in to a Company perimeter approximately 700 meters from the Battalion CP. They were unopposed during their movement and once set in, awaited further direction. At 1330, India Company initiated their movement and passed to the North of Lima Company and up the slope of the hill selected for the Battalion CP that evening. They continued in a Westerly direction and were ascending the hill that would be their outpost, when they came under intense small arms fire and grenade attack at very close range. India Company withdrew and, under continuing contact, consolidated a semi-circular perimeter on the hill behind their furthest point of advance that was the Battalion's objective for the day. With India Company engaged, Lima Company requested approval to go to their aid, supplemented with two gun tanks and a flame tank. Lima Company moved in column with L-3 (Raymond's platoon led by GySgt Almanza, platoon commander) on point, followed by L-1 and L-2. Just as L-2 moved off hill they had been holding, it erupted in 140mm rocket explosions. It is speculated that Raymond was moving with the point elements of L-3 when it crested the hill upon which India Company was dug in. In the confusion of trying to escape the rockets falling to their rear, part of the platoon swept forward momentarily beyond the fighting holes occupied by I-2.

Captain Camp described the situation as, "a terrific volume of fire erupted. It was fairly peaceful one second and then there was this solid CRACK- like the Crack of Doom." As they reached the top of the hill, most of Lima Company dropped into prepared positions where other Marines had been encamped earlier. It is speculated that the NVA were trying to flank I-2's positions when the surge from L-3 ran headlong into them. The NVA took the lead elements of L-3 under fire and prematurely initiated their assault with all of their organic weapons, including RPGs. L-3's surge past the I-2 perimeter threatened the lead elements of the NVA flanking unit and precipitated the huge volume of fire that was directed at Lima Company. It is believed that Cpl Potter was struck in the chest by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) at this point in the battle. While the casualty report indicates he died from an indirect-fire weapon, anecdotal information from Marines who were there suggest that it was an RPG round that hit Cpl Potter at approximately 16:30 on 10 September 1967. Captain Camp relates that at dawn Lima Company fired a 10-second "Mad Moment" and then went out to search the immediate front of their positions to a depth of approximately 10 meters. It was at this time that Lima Company recovered the bodies of two Marines, who had been reported as MIA the previous evening; Raymond's body was one of those recovered. Cpl Potter died instantly in Quang Tri Province, approximately 4 kilometers north northwest of Cam Lo (YD 102644). He died in a toughly contested area near Cam Lo within a kilometer of the locations where his former OCS classmates, 2ndLt Bobo [Honoree Record ID 899] and 1stLt Goodwin [Honoree Record ID 249594] also fell.

In his Command Chronology, the Battalion Commander reported "In two battles against the 812th NVA Regiment on 7 and 10 September, this Battalion was engaged in the hardest fighting it had encountered since arriving in Vietnam." The Marine casualties for 3/26 during September 1967 were reported as 434 WIA and 55 KIA, including Cpl Raymond Potter. The majority of these casualties were sustained during the intense actions on the 7th and the 10th. NVA losses were reported as 191 KIA (confirmed by body count), 376 KIA (probable) and 1 Prisoner of War, again with virtually all inflicted during the fighting on the 7th and the 10th.

What is known with certainty is that CPL Raymond Potter made some courageous decisions: To serve in the infantry rather than another MOS thereby, in effect, volunteering to go to Vietnam, a fate he could have avoided; and, when his Company Commander asked him to go back into the field, after he had already been pulled from duty to prepare for his return to the U.S., he agreed to go back into harm's way to support the Marines of his Company, Platoon and Squad. The second decision cost him his life. His actions on both counts were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the Naval Service. He was respected and loved by the Marines he served with in Lima-2 and Lima-3; they knew of his disappointment in not being commissioned. He earned the respect and admiration of his fellow Marines and his Platoon Commanders for his competent performance and maturity. He gave his life in a last affirmation of concern for "his Marines." While his performance was "above and beyond the call of duty," it was not recognized with a medal, as it should have been.

At the time of his death Ray was 25 years old and single.

Medals and Awards

Purple Heart
Combat Action Ribbon
National Defense Service Medal
Vietnam Service Medal
Vietnam Campaign Medal

Honors

The name Raymond G Potter is located on Panel 26E Line 50 of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall.

Burial

Corporal Raymond George Potter is buried at Saint John's Cemetery in Campbell, OH, in Section 5B, Row 10, Plot 457.

[Thanks to Captain Dave Mellon, USMCR, a classmate in the 38th Officer Candidate Course (although he did not personally know George Potter) for the valuable information he provided for this bio. Capt Mellon served as a platoon commander in Vietnam and was wounded.

Dave Mellon wanted to learn more about Raymond Potter by reconstructing his service in the Marine Corps, especially his service in Vietnam. In his research, he relied on Colonel Richard D. Camp's book "Lima-6," written with military historian Eric Hamel, that tells the story of Raymond's last three months of life from 1 July through 10 September 1967, in great detail, from the perspective of the Commanding Officer of his Company, Lima, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines. He also used Eric Hamel's book "Ambush Valley" that tells the story of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, four-day fight for survival during the period 7-10 September 1967 in a valley about 1 Kilometer North of the artillery fire base know as "C-2" and approximately two Kilometers West of the Main Supply Route (MSR) connecting Cam Lo and Con Thien, the western boundary of "Leatherneck Square." MHOH is grateful to be able to present the true story of this brave Marine.]