Andrew Lawrence Bundermann, a native of Bovey, MN, is a graduate of Itasca Little League in Grand Rapids, MN. On 3 October 2009, the former little leaguer was serving as a U.S. Army First Lieutenant with Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, Task Force Destroyer, in Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

On that day, then-1LT Bundermann's leadership and heroic actions in orchestrating the defense of Combat Outpost Keating, helped prevent it from falling into the hands of a Taliban force of more than 400 fighters. For his gallantry, he was awarded the Silver Star Medal *, the U.S. Army's third highest award for valor.

* "Originally awarded the Silver Star for his actions in the Battle of Kamdesh, Bundermann was one of 12 upgrades from a Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross, the second-highest award for valor. The upgrades were part of a Pentagon-wide review of combat awards given after 11 September 2001, launched by former Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

Now a Captain, Bundermann left the Army in 2012.

Medals, Awards and Badges

Distinguished Service Cross
Bronze Star Medal
Army Commendation Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Army Service Ribbon
Overseas Service Ribbon
NATO ISAF Medal
Valorous Unit Award with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Combat Action Badge

Distinguished Service Cross Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to First Lieutenant Andrew L. Bundermann, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States while serving as the Acting Commander of Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, on 3 October 2009 in Afghanistan. On this date, Combat Outpost Keating and Observation Post Fritsche came under a complex and sizeable enemy attack which breached the outpost's perimeter. Understanding the extreme necessity for external communication to coordinate air support and casualty evacuation, First Lieutenant Bundermann worked with two of his soldiers to set up the only remaining communications platform. Once communication was reestablished, he immediately coordinated with the tactical operations center for direct fire support. As the squadron's supporting artillery was at its maximum range and could not adequately engage targets near Observation Post Fritsche, First Lieutenant Bundermann directed the mortar teams on COP Keating to begin engaging targets at the nearby observation post, allowing the squadron's supporting artillery to effectively engage enemy targets at the combat outpost. As the battle waged on, it became clear to him that the enemy was engaging the combat outpost from a nearby village and had captured the Afghan National Police station. First Lieutenant Bundermann effectively directed his troops indirect fire assets and air support fire on the village neutralizing a key strategic enemy position. Realizing his soldiers were distributed in extended outer positions and the enemy had control of several positions in the combat outpost, he reallocated his forces and made the tactical decision to focus the attack on enemy forces within the perimeter. Having redirected his forces, he led a bold counterattack which cleared the enemy from several critical positions and ultimately led to a successful defense of COP Keating. First Lieutenant Bundermann's actions are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the 61st Cavalry Regiment, and the United States Army.

Narrative to Accompany Award:

In the early morning of 1 October 2009, a re-supply helicopter carrying the B Troop Commander, the Platoon Leader for 3d Platoon, and the 3d Platoon's senior scout was struck with small arms fire in the fuel tank while moving supplies and personnel from Combat Outpost (COP) KEATING to Forward Operating Base (FOB) BOSTICK and back to Observation Post (OP) FRITSCHE. While no one was injured, the helicopter made an emergency landing at FOB BOSTICK to drop off passengers en route to Jalalabad Airfield for repairs. This incident kept the troop commander outside of his area of operations and left First Lieutenant (1LT) Andrew Bundermann as the Ground Force Commander when enemy forces assaulted COP KEATING and OP FRITSCHE on 3 October. With great skill and perseverance, 1LT Bundermann commanded the troop from COP KEATING, controlling force protection, integrating air support and indirect fire assets, and overseeing the complex concert of various enablers on and off the COP to win an arduous battle against a numerically superior enemy. At 0600 on 3 October 2009, COP KEATING and OP FRITSCHE, Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, came under complex attack by an enemy force estimated at 400 fighters. The fighters occupied the high ground on all four sides of the COP and initiated the attack with concentrated fire from B10 recoilless rifles, RPGs, DSHKAs, mortars, and small arms fire (SAF). During the first 3 hours of the attack, mortar rounds impacted on the COP and OP every 15 seconds. All 6 of the troop's M1151 HMMWVs sustained direct hits from RPGs, half of which withstood as many as 8 RPGs each. Within the first several minutes of the battle, mortar rounds hit the main generator on the COP, eliminating power and electricity to most of the camp, including the tactical operations center (TOC) and troop aid station.

Understanding the extreme necessity for external communications to coordinate air support and casualty evacuation, 1LT Bundermann worked with the attached communications specialist and the troop first sergeant to set up the only remaining communications platform, the tactical satellite radio (TACSAT). With communications reestablished, 1LT Bundermann coordinated with the troop fire support officer to de-conflict air support and indirect fire assets. Enemy mortar rounds and RPGs pinned down the troop mortars at COP KEATING and OP FRITSCHE, limiting indirect fire assets to the Soldiers in the fight. As a result of his critical ability to think quickly on a very complex battlefield, 1LT Bundermann coordinated with the squadron TOC for indirect fire support in support of OP FRITSCHE. Understanding that the squadron's 155-mm. capabilities were barely within the maximum range of COP KEATING, 1LT Bundermann shifted fires in support of OP FRITSCHE, which was one and a half kilometers south of COP KEATING. The squadron's indirect fire support assets could strike targets in the vicinity of OPH FRITSCHE much more accurately, and ultimately, the 155-mm. indirect fire support for OP FRITSCHE suppressed enemy mortar and dismount teams, enabling B Troop mortarmen at OP FRITSCHE to man their mortar pit. Within several minutes, as 1LT Bundermann had planned, the squadron indirect fires assisted in protecting the mortars on OP FRITSCHE, allowing 1LT Bundermann to integrate crucial combined arms capabilities against a complicated enemy raid in unforgiving mountainous terrain. As the fight waged on, it became apparent to 1LT Bundermann that a majority of the enemy contact was coming from the nearby town of Urmol, which bordered the river along the COP's northern perimeter.

Early in the morning on 3 October, fighters from the Taliban and Hezb-Islami-Gulbuddin entered Urmol, sent the villagers away, and established multiple fighting positions oriented toward COP KEATING. Shortly thereafter and unbeknownst to American and Afghan forces on the COP, the enemy fighters took control of the Afghan National Police (ANP) station at the base of Urmol, approximately 100 meters northwest of the COP's entry control point (ECP). For much of the morning, the fighting positions in Urmol and the ANP station served as enemy strong points, enabling the AAF to engage the ECP) and northern guard position with heavy and accurate DSHKA, RPG, and small arms fire. While attempting to destroy a particularly effective enemy machine gun nest with an AT-4, Sergeant (SGT) Joshua Kirk was fatally hit with an RPG. By the time the aid and litter team evacuated SGT Kirk to the aid station, 1LT Bundermann understood the significant opposition within the town and police station. In order to preserve the lives of his men, he made the difficult decision to engage the enemy in Urmol and the ANP station with indirect fire and direct fire from attack aviation assets. By diminishing the enemy threat to their north and northwest, 1LT Bundermann was able to better focus the defense of COP KEATING to the southeast and west. 1LT Bundermann had a keen understanding of the rules of engagement, and his personal courage and competence enabled him to coordinate for this difficult and complex call that ultimately saved the lives of a section's worth of Soldiers. In conjunction with the Afghan National Army collapsing their positions, Taliban fighters breached the perimeter of COP KEATING and stormed the outpost, forcing the American Soldiers to fight on an extremely congested battlefield. As the fighting continued, several hostile rounds set many buildings ablaze, eventually setting fire to and destroying close to 70% of COP KEATING. While smoothly transitioning back and forth between multiple maneuvering ground forces, 1LT Bundermann devised a plan to slow the spread of fire, saving them crucial minutes to gather necessary equipment from the TOC. After a little more than an hour, the TOC caught fire. 1LT Bundermann made the decision to abandon the building and salvage his diminishing command and control capabilities in order to continue operations.

Throughout the 12-hour battle, as well as during the 4 days of enemy contact that followed, American Forces killed over 100 Taliban fighters and injured at least 80 more. Despite the resounding tactical success against a numerically superior enemy, 8 Americans and 2 Afghan National Army Soldiers died and an additional 43 American and Afghan forces were injured. While using the 2 degraded maneuver sections on COP KEATING to destroy the enemy and defend the COP, several of the troopers were cut off from the nucleus of the COP. Battle positions ran out of ammunition due to a lack of covered re-supply routes, enemy forces temporarily controlled the ammunition supply point (ASP) and the helicopter landing zone (HLZ), indirect fire assets were pinned down, the perimeter was breached, the COP was in flames, and the troop was sustaining multiple casualties. Throughout the entire attack, 1LT Bundermann provided unwavering leadership to the men of B Troop, 3d Squadron, 61st Cavalry. He acted heroically under heavy enemy fire by orchestrating numerous enablers in a high intensity conflict. Caught in an overwhelming firefight under a wave of oncoming Taliban fighters for well over 2 hours, 4 additional Soldiers were killed and many more were injured during valiant attempts to beat back the enemy. Shortly afterwards, Captain (CPT) Cordova, the senior medical professional on COP KEATING, determined that Private First Class (PFC) Mace, who had been hit by enemy RPG rounds, would not survive without a blood transfusion. Identifying only a few Soldiers, including himself, on the COP with PFC Mace's blood type, 1LT Bundermann selflessly volunteered his own blood to keep his Soldier alive. Continuing to direct section movements on the ground, 1LT Bundermann made the assessment that if he did not collapse his extended outer positions to a tighter inner-perimeter, he and his Soldiers could be completely overrun; therefore he pulled in the available, redundant positions to reorient his Soldiers. Once again making a tactically necessary decision, 1LT Bundermann decided to shift focus inside the COP rather than outside the perimeter. In a bold counterattack, 1LT Bundermann managed a series of clearance missions that retook the ASP, secured the Shura building and the ECP, and enabled the troop aid station to shift casualties to a newly protected position.